NFC-SEC-04: NFC-SEC Entity Authentication and Key Agreement using Symmetric Cryptography
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Introduction

The NFC Security series of standards comprise a common services and protocol Standard and NFC-SEC cryptography standards.

This NFC-SEC cryptography Standard specifies an NFC Entity Authentication (NEAU) mechanism that uses the symmetric cryptographic algorithm (NEAU-S) for mutual authentication of two NFC entities.

This Standard addresses entity authentication of two NFC entities possessing a Pre-Shared Authentication Key (PSAK) during the key agreement and confirmation for the Shared Secret Service (SSE) and Secure Channel Service (SCH).

This Standard adds entity authentication to the services provided by ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) NFC-SEC-02.

This third edition is fully aligned with ISO/IEC 13157-5:2016.

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NFC-SEC-04: NFC-SEC Entity Authentication and Key Agreement using Symmetric Cryptography

1 Scope

This Standard specifies the message contents and the cryptographic mechanisms for PID 04.

This Standard specifies key agreement and confirmation mechanisms providing mutual authentication, using symmetric cryptography.

NOTE This Standard adds entity authentication to the services provided by ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) NFC-SEC-02.

2 Conformance

Conformant implementations employ the security mechanisms specified in this NFC-SEC cryptography Standard (identified by PID 04) and conform to ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385).

The NFC-SEC security services shall be established through the protocol specified in ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385) and the mechanisms specified in this Standard.

3 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.


ISO/IEC 14443-3, Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards -- Proximity cards -- Part 3: Initialization and anticollision


ISO/IEC 18092, Information technology -- Telecommunications and information exchange between systems -- Near Field Communication -- Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-1) (ECMA-340)


4 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in Clause 4 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) and the following apply.

4.1 entity authentication

Corroboration that an entity is the one claimed

[ISO/IEC 9798-1: 2010]

4.2 n-entity-title

A name that is used to identify unambiguously an n-entity

[ISO/IEC 7498-1: 1994]

4.3 symmetric cryptography (symmetric cryptographic technique)

Cryptographic technique that uses the same secret key for both the originator's and the recipient's transformation

[ISO/IEC 9798-1: 2010]

5 Conventions and notations

Clause 5 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) applies. Additionally, the following conversions and notations following apply.

⊕ exclusive OR

For any message field “F”, F denotes the value placed in the field upon sending, F’ the value upon receipt.
6 Acronyms

Clause 6 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) applies. Additionally, the following acronyms apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEIA</td>
<td>Encryption and Integrity Key in Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKA</td>
<td>Master Key in Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAU-S</td>
<td>NEAU using Symmetric Cryptography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAK</td>
<td>Pre-Shared Authentication Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLV</td>
<td>Type-length-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UID</td>
<td>Unique Identifier [ISO/IEC 14443-3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSEED</td>
<td>The Seed of Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 General

This Standard specifies the NFC Entity Authentication using Symmetric cryptography (NEAU-S), using the key agreement and confirmation protocol in ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385).

To enable a key agreement and confirmation mechanism providing mutual authentication between NFC entities before they start the Shared Secret Service (SSE) and the Secure Channel Service (SCH), the Pre-Shared Authentication Key (PSAK), as a credential, between these entities is used in the entity authentication. After successful NEAU-S completion, a shared secret Z that is used to establish the SSE and the SCH will be generated.

Three-pass authentication per ISO/IEC 9798-2, mechanism 4, and key establishment per ISO/IEC 11770-2, mechanism 6, are used in NEAU-S.

The relationship between NEAU-S and ISO/IEC 13157-1 (ECMA-385) is shown in Figure 1.
8 Fields and PDUs for NEAU-S

8.1 Protocol Identifier (PID)

This Standard shall use the one octet protocol identifier PID with value 4.

8.2 NFC-SEC-PDUs

The peer NFC-SEC entities shall establish a shared secret Z using ACT_REQ, ACT_RES, VFY_REQ and VFY_RES according to the NEAU-S mechanism.

8.3 Entity identifiers

The n-entity-title of the Sender’s and Recipient’s n-entity shall be used as IDs and IDR, respectively. Figure 2 specifies the encoding of IDs and IDR in the TLV format.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Octets:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2 — ID format**

1. The Type subfield specifies the type of the ID and shall be 1 octet in length. The values are:
   a) 1: Value subfield contains Sender (A) identification number, IDₐ;
   b) 2: Value subfield contains Recipient (B) identification number, IDᵦ;
   c) All other values are RFU.

2. The 2-octet Length subfield contains the length in number of octets of the Value subfield, in the range of 1 to 65535.

9 Primitives

9.1 General requirements

Clause 9 specifies cryptographic primitives of NEAU-S. Clause 10 specifies the actual use of these primitives. Table 1 specifies the size and description of parameters.

**Table 1 — NEAU-S parameters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Field Size</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSAK</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Pre-Shared authentication key available to the Sender (A) and the Recipient (B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKA</td>
<td>128 bits</td>
<td>Master key used in the entity authentication and derived from the PSAK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEIA</td>
<td>128 bits</td>
<td>Encryption and integrity key used in the entity authentication and derived from the MKA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>96 bits</td>
<td>Message authentication code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDₐ</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>The Sender (A) identification number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDᵦ</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>The Recipient (B) identification number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSEEDₐ</td>
<td>256 bits</td>
<td>The Sender’s seed for the derivation of the shared secret Z.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSEEDᵦ</td>
<td>256 bits</td>
<td>The Recipient’s seed for the derivation of the shared secret Z.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>96 bits</td>
<td>Initial value of counter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ISO/IEC 18031 shall be used to generate the random nonces and keys, with the exception of Dual_EC_DRBG.

9.2  Entity authentication

9.2.1  Mechanism

Peer NFC-SEC entities achieve mutual authentication per ISO/IEC 9798-2, mechanism 4 by use of the PSAK which shall be known to them prior to the commencement of the NEAU-S mechanism.

9.2.2  AES

AES per 5.1 of ISO/IEC 18033-3 shall be used for encryption, decryption and MACing during the entity authentication.

9.2.3  Modes of operation

In the NEAU-S mechanism, the data authenticated encryption mode shall be GCM mode per 11 Authenticated encryption mechanism 6 (GCM) of ISO/IEC 19772.

9.2.4  Message Authentication Code (MAC)

MACing shall be used for integrity protection of the payload of ACT_RES, VFY_REQ and VFY_RES.

9.3  Key agreement

The shared secret Z shall be established using key establishment from ISO/IEC 11770-2, mechanism 6, which requires both entities to contribute their seeds.

9.4  Key confirmation

9.4.1  Overview

The MK shall be derived using the KDF per 9.2 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409). This key confirmation mechanism is according to Clause 9 of ISO/IEC 11770-3. The MAC used for Key Confirmation (MacTag) shall be AES in CMAC-96 mode per ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409).

9.4.2  Key confirmation tag generation

The MacTagA in VFY_REQ shall be:

\[
\text{MacTag}_A = \text{AES-CMAC-96}_MK (\text{MK}, (02) || \text{IDs} || \text{IDr} || \text{NA} || \text{NB}),
\]

using AES-CMAC-96_MK per ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409), with key MK.

The MacTagB in VFY_RES shall be:

\[
\text{MacTag}_B = \text{AES-CMAC-96}_MK (\text{MK}, (03) || \text{IDr} || \text{IDs} || \text{NB} || \text{NA}),
\]

using AES-CMAC-96_MK per ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409), with key MK.

9.4.3  Key confirmation tag verification

The MacTagA shall be checked by evaluating the equation:

\[
\text{MacTag}_A' = \text{AES-CMAC-96}_MK (\text{MK}, (02) || \text{IDs} || \text{IDr} || \text{NA}' || \text{NB})
\]
The MacTagB shall be checked by evaluating the equation:

\[
\text{MacTag}_B' = \text{AES-CMAC-96}_\text{MK} (\text{MK}, (03) || \text{ID}_R || \text{ID}_S || \text{NB}' || \text{NA})
\]

9.5 Key Derivation Function (KDF)

9.5.1 Overview

Four KDFs are specified in NEAU-S for generating:

- MKA and KEIA;
- the shared secret Z;
- key of SSE and
- key of SCH.

9.5.2 KDF for MKA and KEIA

The PRF shall be CMAC per 9.2 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409), used with 128 bits output length. It will be denoted AES-CMAC-PRF-128. For the following sections PRF is:

\[
\text{PRF} (K, S) = \text{AES-CMAC-PRF-128}_K (S)
\]

The KDF for the MKA and KEIA shall be:

\[
\{\text{MKA}, \text{KEIA}\} = \text{KDF-MKA-KEIA} (\text{NA}, \text{NB}, \text{ID}_S, \text{ID}_R, \text{PSAK})
\]

Detail of the KDF-MKA-KEIA function:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Seed} &= (\text{NA} [1..64] || \text{NB} [1..64]) \\
\text{SKEYSEED} &= \text{PRF(Seed, PSAK)} \\
\text{MKA} &= \text{PRF (SKEYSEED, Seed $||$ ID}_S $||$ ID}_R $||$ (01)) \\
\text{KEIA} &= \text{PRF (SKEYSEED, MKA $||$ Seed $||$ ID}_S $||$ ID}_R $||$ (02))
\end{align*}
\]

The keys MKA and KEIA shall be different for each NEAU-S invocation.

9.5.3 KDF for the shared secret Z

The value of the shared secret Z shall be generated per a) of Annex C of ISO/IEC 11770-2:

\[
Z = Z\text{SEED}_S \oplus Z\text{SEED}_R
\]

9.5.4 KDF for the SSE and SCH

9.2.1 and 9.2.2 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) apply.
9.6 Data authenticated encryption during authentication

9.6.1 Initial values (IV)

Both entities shall calculate AES-CMAC-PRF-128\textsuperscript{MK} per 9.5.1 of per ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409), where MK equals MKA.

Both entities shall set their IV for AuthEncData\textsubscript{R} to AES-CMAC-PRF-128\textsubscript{MK}[1..96], their IV for SCH to AES-CMAC-PRF-128\textsubscript{MK}[17..112] and their IV for AuthEncData\textsubscript{S} to AES-CMAC-PRF-128\textsubscript{MK}[33..128].

9.6.2 Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)

This data is only authenticated, but not encrypted.

\[ \text{AAD} = \text{SEP} \ || \ \text{PID} \]

9.6.3 NEAU-S payload encryption and MAC generation

The data shall be authenticated and encrypted using KEIA as specified in 11.6 Encryption procedure of ISO/IEC 19772:

\[ \text{AuthEncData} = \text{ENC}_{\text{KEIA}} (\text{AAD}, \text{IV}, \text{Data}), \text{ with } t = 96. \]

The AuthEncData\textsubscript{R} in ACT\_RES shall be:

\[ \text{AuthEncData}_{\text{R}} = \text{ENC}_{\text{KEIA}} (\text{AAD}, \text{IV}, \text{NB} \ || \ \text{NA}' \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{R}} \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{S}} \ || \ \text{ZSEED}_{\text{R}}). \]

AuthEncData\textsubscript{R} contains the encrypted data EncData\textsubscript{R} and MAC\textsubscript{R}. The MAC\textsubscript{R} length is 96 bits.

The AuthEncData\textsubscript{S} in VFY\_REQ shall be:

\[ \text{AuthEncData}_{\text{S}} = \text{ENC}_{\text{KEIA}} (\text{AAD}, \text{IV}, \text{NA} \ || \ \text{NB}' \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{S}} \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{R}} \ || \ \text{ZSEED}_{\text{S}}). \]

AuthEncData\textsubscript{S} contains the encrypted data EncData\textsubscript{S} and MAC\textsubscript{S}. The MAC\textsubscript{S} length is 96 bits.

9.6.4 NEAU-S payload decryption and MAC verification

The authenticated and encrypted data shall be decrypted and verified using KEIA as specified in 11.7 Decryption procedure of ISO/IEC 19772:

\[ \text{DEC}_{\text{KEIA}} (\text{AAD}, \text{IV}, \text{AuthEncData}) \text{ shall return Data}' \text{ if valid} \]

\text{INVALID otherwise}

The EncData\textsubscript{R}' and MAC\textsubscript{R}' in ACT\_RES shall be:

\[ \text{NB}' \ || \ \text{NA} \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{R}}' \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{S}}' \ || \ \text{ZSEED}_{\text{R}}' \ || \ \text{MAC}_{\text{R}}' = \text{DEC}_{\text{KEIA}} (\text{AAD}, \text{IV}, \text{AuthEncData}_{\text{R}}'). \]

The EncData\textsubscript{S}' and MAC\textsubscript{S}' in VFY\_REQ shall be:

\[ \text{NA}' \ || \ \text{NB} \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{S}}' \ || \ \text{ID}_{\text{R}}' \ || \ \text{ZSEED}_{\text{S}}' \ || \ \text{MAC}_{\text{S}}' = \text{DEC}_{\text{KEIA}} (\text{AAD}, \text{IV}, \text{AuthEncData}_{\text{S}}'). \]
10 NEAU-S mechanism

10.1 Protocol overview

NEAU-S mechanism is illustrated in Figure 3. During the NEAU-S, if any check fails, then ‘PDU content valid’ shall be set to false.

Sender (A) | Recipient (B)
---|---
Generate NA | Generate NB and ZSEED<sub>B</sub>
Check NA | Compute MKA and KEIA
Compute MKA and KEIA | Compute EncData<sub>B</sub> and MAC<sub>B</sub>
Check MAC<sub>A</sub>|' and decrypt EncData<sub>R</sub>|' | Check NA'| and NB
Check ID<sub>A</sub>|' and ID<sub>R</sub>|' and NA | Generate ZSEED<sub>B</sub>
Compute EncData<sub>B</sub>, MAC<sub>B</sub>, shared secret Z, MK, MacTag<sub>A</sub>, and perform key confirmation | Compute EncData<sub>A</sub>, MAC<sub>A</sub>, shared secret Z, MK, MacTag<sub>B</sub>, and perform key confirmation
Check MacTag<sub>B</sub>|' | Use MK as the Shared Secret of SSE and link key of SCH
Use MK as the Shared Secret of SSE and link key of SCH | Check MacTag<sub>A</sub>|'

Figure 3 — NEAU-S mechanism overview

10.2 Preparation

Before starting the NEAU-S mechanism, the followings shall be available to each NFC-SEC entity:

- Its own PSAK. PSAK is a static key that is distributed to the NFC entities by a method outside the scope of this Standard. Guidance on the management of pre-shared authentication keys is provided in ISO/IEC 11770-1 and ISO/IEC 11770-2.

- Each NFC-SEC entity shall be in possession of its own and its peer’s n-entity-title.

  NOTE The NFCIP-1-entity-title is the nfcid3 per ISO/IEC 18092, the 14443-3-entity-title is the UID.

10.3 Sender (A) transformation

1. Generate a nonce NA per 9.1.5 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409).
2. Send NA as the payload of the ACT_REQ.
3. Receive NB'| NA || EncData<sub>R</sub>|' || MAC<sub>R</sub>|' from the payload of the ACT_RES.
4. Perform the following:
a) check if the random number NA sent to the Recipient (B) in the payload of the ACT_REQ is the same as received in the ACT_RES;

b) derive keys MKA and KEIA per 9.5.2;

c) decipher EncDataR' and verify the value of MACs' per 9.6.4, obtain the values of NB', NA, IDr', IDs' and ZSEEDs', then verify that the IDr' and IDs' equal the respective n-entity-title values specified in 10.2;

d) check that the random number NA sent to the Recipient (B) in the payload of the ACT_REQ and the random number NB' received from the Recipient (B) in the payload of the ACT_RES are the same as the received in the EncDataR'.

5. Compute the value of EncDataS and MACs per 9.6.3, generating the nonce ZSEEDs per 9.1.5 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409).

6. Generate the shared secret Z per 9.5.3.

7. Compute the MK and MacTagA per 9.2 of ISO/IEC 13157-2 (ECMA-386) and 9.4.2 respectively.

8. Send NA || NB' || EncDataS || MACs || MacTagA as the payload of the VFY_REQ.

9. Receive MacTagBs' from the payload of the VFY_RES.

10. Check the key confirmation tag received from Recipient (B): MacTagBs'(MK) per 9.4.3.

11. Set the ‘PDU content valid’ to true, use MK as the Shared Secret of SSE and link key of SCH respectively.

10.4 Recipient (B) transformation

1. Receive NA’ from the payload of the ACT_REQ.

2. Generate a nonce NB and the seed ZSEEDs per 9.1.5 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409).

3. Derive keys MKA and KEIA per 9.5.2.

4. Compute the value of EncDataR and MACR per 9.6.3.

5. Send NB || NA' || EncDataR || MACR as the payload of the ACT_RES.

6. Receive NA' || NB || EncDatas' || MACs' || MacTagA' from the payload of the VFY_REQ.

7. Perform the following:

   a) check if the random numbers NA' and NB sent to the Sender (A) in the payload of the ACT_RES are the same as received in the VFY_REQ;

   b) decipher EncDatas' and verify the value of MACs' per 9.6.4, obtain the values of NA', NB, IDs', IDr' and ZSEEDs', then verify that the IDr' and IDs' equal the respective n-entity-title values specified in 10.2;

   c) check that the random numbers NA' and NB sent to the Sender (A) in the payload of the ACT_RES are the same as received in the EncDataS'.
8. Generate the shared secret $Z$ per 9.5.3.

9. Compute the MK and check the key confirmation tag received from Sender (A): $\text{MacTag}_A$ (MK) per 9.2 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) and 9.4.3 respectively.

10. Compute $\text{MacTag}_B$ per 9.4.2 and send it as the payload of the VFY_RES.

11. Set the ‘PDU content valid’ to true, use MK as the Shared Secret of SSE and link key of SCH respectively.

11 **Data Authenticated Encryption in SCH**

Clause 12 of ISO/IEC 13157-3 (ECMA-409) applies.